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Abstract  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Industry Trends Program (ITP) collects and analyzes 
industry-wide data, assesses the safety significance of results, and communicates results to Congress and 
other stakeholders.  This paper outlines potential enhancements in the ITP to comprehensively cover the 
Initiating Events Cornerstone of Safety.  Future work will address other cornerstones of safety.  The 
proposed Tier 1 activity involves collecting data on ten categories of risk-significant initiating events, 
trending the results, and comparing yearly performance with prediction limits (allowable numbers of 
events, above which NRC action may occur).  Tier 1 results would be used to monitor industry performance 
at the level of individual categories of initiating events.  The proposed Tier 2 activity involves integrating 
the information for individual initiating event categories into a single risk-based indicator, termed the 
Baseline Risk Index for Initiating Events or BRIIE.  The BRIIE would be evaluated yearly and compared 
against a threshold.  BRIIE results would be reported to Congress on a yearly basis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
provides oversight of plant safety performance on a 
plant-specific basis using both inspection findings and 
plant-level performance indicators as part of its Reactor 
Oversight Process (ROP).  Public health and safety 
assurance is divided into three strategic performance 
areas: reactor safety, radiation safety, and safeguards.
These areas are subdivided into seven Cornerstones of 
Safety: initiating events, mitigating systems, barrier 
integrity, emergency preparedness, public radiation safety, 
occupational radiation safety, and physical protection.
Individual issues that are identified as having generic 
safety significance are addressed using other NRC 
processes, including the generic communications process 
and the generic safety issue process. 
As discussed in SECY-01-0111 [1], the NRC's Office 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) initiated the ITP in 
2001 to complement these processes by monitoring and 
assessing industry-level trends in safety performance.  
The purposes of the ITP are to provide a means to confirm 
that the nuclear industry is maintaining the safety 
performance of operating reactors and, by clearly 
demonstrating that performance, to enhance stakeholder 
confidence in the efficacy of the NRC's processes.  The 
objectives of the ITP are the following: 
Collect and monitor industry-wide data that can be 
used to assess whether the nuclear industry is 
maintaining the safety performance of operating 
plants and provide feedback on the ROP 
Assess the safety significance and causes of any 
statistically significant adverse industry trends, 
determine if the trends represent an actual 
degradation in overall industry safety performance, 
and respond appropriately to any safety issues that 
may be identified 
Communicate industry-level information to Congress 
and other stakeholders in an effective and timely 
manner. 
The existing ITP is summarized in SECY-05-0069 [2] 
and on the NRC public website at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ oversight/industry-
trends.html.  Presently, the ITP is monitoring various 
industry indicators developed by the former NRC Office 
of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD), 
industry-level data from the ROP performance indicators, 
and Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) data.  The 
AEOD indicators were reported annually in the NUREG-
1187 series [3] up through 1999.  Industry-level data from 
the ROP indicators are updated quarterly and presented on 
the NRC website.  Finally, the ASP results were reported 
annually in the NUREG/CR-4674 series up through 1998. 
 The most current status of the ASP program is 
summarized in SECY-04-0210 [4].  This most current set 
of diverse performance indicators was chosen for initial 
inclusion in the ITP based mainly on historical precedent 
and availability of data. 
II. REASONS FOR ENHANCING CURRENT ITP 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Current ITP performance indicators have both 
strengths and weaknesses.  Strengths include availability 
of historical results, continuity and consistency in yearly 
evaluations, and broad coverage of the Cornerstones of 
Safety.  However, weaknesses in the Initiating Events and 
Mitigating Systems Cornerstones of Safety include (1) 
overlapping coverage by performance indicators from 
different sources, (2) limited risk coverage, and (3) 
difficulties in interpreting the risk significance of 
significant adverse trends. 
In terms of risk coverage, work documented in 
NUREG-1753 [5] indicates that the ROP indicators 
“Unplanned scrams” and “Scrams with loss of normal 
heat removal” probably cover less than 20 percent of the 
total internal event core damage risk for the Initiating 
Events Cornerstone of Safety.  (The other 80 percent of 
risk involves less frequent initiating events that cannot be 
monitored on a plant-specific basis over the limited, three-
year time period covered by the ROP indicators.)  This 
limited coverage of risk by the ROP performance 
indicators is supplemented by inspections. 
As a first step in enhancing the ITP to remedy the 
weaknesses discussed above, the Initiating Events 
Cornerstone of Safety was chosen as the area of focus.
Work focused on development of performance indicators 
that did not overlap in coverage, significantly increased 
the risk coverage, and provided a mechanism for 
determining the risk significance of changes in 
performance, at both the individual initiating event level 
and at the integrated, Cornerstone of Safety level.  The 
process and results are documented in the following 
sections.
III. ENHANCEMENT PROCESS FOR INITIATING 
EVENTS CORNERSTONE OF SAFETY 
To enhance the ITP coverage of the Initiating Events 
Cornerstone of Safety, a three-step process was used. The 
first step was to identify appropriate initiating event 
classes.  Then methods for trending and establishing 
performance-based prediction limits for these individual 
initiating event classes were developed (Tier 1, 
performance-based monitoring of individual initiating 
event classes).  Finally, an integrated, risk-informed 
indicator was developed by combining the individual 
initiating event category information (Tier 2, risk-
informed monitoring at the Cornerstone of Safety level).  
Each of these steps is discussed in this section. 
III.A Identification of Risk-Significant Initiating Event 
Categories
The initiating event study [6].  provides data for a 
large number of initiating event categories for the period 
calendar year (CY) 1987 through CY 1995.  (NRC is 
continually updating these data, but NUREGs are no 
longer being published.  Instead, the results are posted on 
an internal NRC website, with plans to post them on the 
NRC public website.)  A subset of these categories has 
been identified as being risk significant in NUREG-1753. 
 The list of risk-significant initiating event categories 
considered in the enhanced ITP is presented in Table I.
This list includes ten initiating event categories applicable 
to pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and nine applicable 
to boiling water reactors (BWRs).  Initiating event 
categories broken down into separate PWR and BWR 
categories were shown to have statistically significant 
differences in frequencies in the initiating events study.
For the other initiating event categories, PWR and BWR 
frequencies were not significantly different, and both 
types of reactors were combined to obtain frequencies.  In 
general, these risk-significant initiating event categories 
cover approximately 90% of the internal event core 
damage risk (excluding internal flooding) from the 103 
operating commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S.  
Also, there is no overlap between these initiating events 
categories.
TABLE I. Risk-Significant Initiating Event Classes Covered by the BRIIE 
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) 
1. Loss of offsite power 1. Loss of offsite power 
2. Loss of vital AC bus 2. Loss of vital AC bus 
3. Loss of vital DC bus 3. Loss of vital DC bus 
4. Loss of feedwater 4. Loss of feedwater 
5. Small loss of coolant accident 5. Small loss of coolant accident 
6. PWR general transient 6. BWR general transient 
7. PWR loss of heat sink 7. BWR loss of heat sink 
8. PWR stuck open safety/relief valve 8. BWR stuck open safety/relief valve 
9. PWR loss of instrument air 9. BWR loss of instrument air 
10. Steam generator tube rupture  
 The three enhanced ITP risk-significant 
initiating event categories that correspond roughly with 
ROP performance indicators (Items 4, 6, and 7 in Table I) 
occur frequently enough such that they can be monitored 
on a plant-specific basis over a period of one or three 
years.  However, their coverage of internal events core 
damage risk is approximately 20%. The ITP enhancement 
also includes the other risk-significant initiating event 
categories listed in Table I because of two reasons:
including these other categories increases the risk 
coverage to approximately 90%, and events within these 
categories are frequent enough to monitor on an industry-
wide basis.  In the enhanced ITP, these risk-significant 
initiating event categories would replace the ROP 
“Unplanned scrams” and “Scrams with loss of normal 
heat removal” and ex-AEOD  “Automatic reactor scrams 
while critical” performance indicators.  At present, it is 
not clear whether the ROP “Unplanned power changes” 
performance indicator would remain in the enhanced ITP. 
 This performance indicator has no direct relation to CDF, 
and a decision would have to be made whether its 
inclusion is appropriate in the enhanced ITP coverage of 
the Initiating Events Cornerstone of Safety. 
III.B Performance Monitoring of Risk-Significant 
Initiating Event Categories (Tier 1) 
The proposed Tier 1 activity involves trending risk-
significant initiating event categories and monitoring 
yearly industry performance against prediction limits. To 
accomplish this, up-to-date baseline frequencies were 
established for each of the risk-significant initiating event 
categories (Table II). Then, given these baseline 
frequencies and estimated yearly industry total critical 
reactor years of operation, the ITP enhancement 
determinedperformance-based prediction limits on the 
industry-wide numbers of events.  Ten risk-significant 
initiating event categories are covered for PWRs, while 
nine are covered for BWRs. Data for these initiating event 
categories  numbers of events and corresponding reactor 
critical years  are already being collected and analyzed 
by the NRC on a continual basis, so no additional data 
collection is needed to support the Tier 1 activities. 
The prediction limits in Table II are statistically 
determined and performance based, and include both 
aleatory uncertainty (the randomness of the event count in 
the future year) and epistemic uncertainty (lack of perfect 
knowledge of the value of the baseline frequency). Both 
95% and 99% limits are presented for illustrative 
purposes. An expert elicitation approach is proposed to 
decide which set of limits (or some other set) is most 
appropriate for the Tier 1 activity.  For informational 
purposes, the actual industry performances for fiscal years 
(FYs) 2002 and 2003 are also shown in Table II.  In 
FY 2003, the PWR General Transients exceeded the 95% 
and the Loss of Offsite Power exceeded both limits (due 
to the widespread grid blackout on August 14, 2003). 
As an example of the Tier 1 trending analysis, the 
historical performance of the PWR general transient 
category is shown in Figure 1. Over the period FY 1988 
through approximately FY 1997, industry performance 
improved considerably (the initiating event category 
frequency dropped). However, over the period FY 1998 
through FY 2001 (the period used for determining an up-
to-date baseline frequency), the industry performance was 
essentially constant.
TABLE II. Tier 1 Performance-Based Prediction Limits 
Risk-significant
Initiating Event 
Baseline
Mean 
Frequency 
(per Plant per 
Critical Year) 
Reactor Critical 
Years Assumed 
for One Year of 
Industry 
Operation
Expected
Number of 
Events Over 
One Year 
95%
Prediction
Limit 
(Industry 
Event Counts 
Over One 
Year)
99%
Prediction
Limit 
(Industry 
Event Counts 
Over One 
Year)
Actual
Industry 
Event
Counts
for FY 
2002
Actual
Industry 
Event
Counts
for FY 
2003
PWR General Transients 7.64E-1 61.72 47 61 67 30 62 
BWR General Transients 8.95E-1 31.77 28 39 44 22 22 
PWR Loss of Heat Sink 9.74E-2 61.72 6 12 14 3 5 
BWR Loss of Heat Sink 1.90E-1 31.77 6 12 14 6 9 
Loss of Feedwater 1.02E-1 93.49 10 16 19 2 9 
Loss of Offsite Power 1.71E-2 93.49 2 5 7 1 11 
Loss of Vital AC Bus 2.75E-2 93.49 3 7 8 4 3 
Loss of Vital DC Bus 2.96E-3 93.49 0.3 2 3 0 0 
PWR Stuck Open SRV 3.12E-3 61.72 0.2 2 3 0 0 
BWR Stuck Open SRV 2.13E-2 31.77 0.7 3 4 1 0 
PWR Loss of Instrument 
Air 1.22E-2 61.72 0.8 3 5 1 1 
BWR Loss of Instrument 
Air 1.08E-2 31.77 0.3 3 3 0 0 
Small/Very Small LOCA 4.65E-3 93.49 0.4 3 4 0 0 
PWR Steam Generator 
Tube Rupture 4.37E-3 61.72 0.3 2 3 0 0 
Figure 1. PWR General Transient Initiating Event Trend 
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These ITP Tier 1 activities will help the NRC identify 
degrading industry performance as an adjunct to the plant-
specific performance assessment performed as part of the 
ROP.  Tier 1 activities and results are not reported to the 
U.S. Congress in the annual accountability report.
However, the Tier 1 results will be placed on the NRC 
public website for access by interested stakeholders. 
III.C Risk-Informed Monitoring of Initiating Events 
Cornerstone of Safety (Tier 2) 
An integrated performance indicator is proposed for 
the enhanced ITP Tier 2 coverage of the Initiating Events 
Cornerstone of Safety.  It involves evaluating the risk 
significance of changes in industry initiating event 
category performance (the results of the Tier 1 activity).  
Risk significance is evaluated in terms of an index related 
to change in core damage frequency (CDF) or ǻCDF.
The indicator combines operating experience for risk-
significant initiating event categories with associated 
internal event CDF-based importance information. 
The indicator is able to appropriately combine 
frequent and infrequent initiating event categories with 
different risk measures (Birnbaum importances). This 
indicator is termed the Baseline Risk Index for Initiating 
Events, or BRIIE.  The main use of the BRIIE is to 
combine individual initiating event category performance 
changes into an integrated, risk-informed indicator at the 
Initiating Events Cornerstone of Safety level.  The BRIIE 
would solve two deficiencies in the present ITP:  no 
systematic and defined method for determining whether 
individual initiating event category performance changes 
or adverse trends are risk significant, and no systematic 
and defined method for integrating individual initiating 
event category performance changes into an overall risk 
result at the Cornerstone of Safety level.  Results of the 
BRIIE would be reported to the U.S. Congress in the 
annual accountability report. 
The BRIIE formulation, related to changes in CDF 
(ǻCDF per plant), is given by the following equation:       
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where
BRIIE = estimate of plant-average change in  
  core damage frequency resulting from 
  changes in industry-average initiating  
  event performance (m different
  initiating event classes) 
Bi = plant-average Birnbaum importance  
  for the initiating event class i
Oi = industry-average current frequency  
  for the initiating event class i
Oi,baseline = industry-average baseline frequency  
  for the initiating event class i.
BWRs and PWRs have different core damage 
frequencies, which depend to some extent on different 
initiating events.  The risk weights for various initiating 
event categories are also different for the two types of 
reactors.  Therefore, BRIIE results are proposed for each 
reactor type.  However, the two BRIIE results could be 
combined into a single index, if desired. 
The BRIIE formulation uses industry-average (or 
PWR- or BWR-average) Birnbaums and combines the 
industry-wide data to generate the “common industry 
current frequency” for each initiating event category.
Alternative formulations are possible using plant-specific 
Birnbaums and/or plant-specific initiating event category 
data and then summing the individual plant results to 
obtain an industry result.  Results using all of the various 
calculation methods indicated that the proposed 
formulation in Equation (1) provides the most BRIIE 
sensitivity.
As formulated in Equation (1), the BRIIE is similar to 
the proposed Mitigating Systems Performance Index 
(MSPI) being piloted in the ROP [7, 8].  Both the BRIIE 
and the MSPI use Birnbaum importance measures as 
weighting factors.  (The MSPI approach combines CDF, 
Fussell-Vesely importance, and basic event probability 
information, but the result is equivalent to the Birnbaum 
importance measure.)  Also, both determine current 
performance and compare that with baseline performance 
to evaluate changes in performance.  However, the MSPI 
is being applied to the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of 
Safety on a plant-specific basis, while the BRIIE applies 
to the Initiating Events Cornerstone of Safety on an 
industry-wide basis.  Also, the BRIIE integrates all of the 
initiating event categories into a single indicator at the 
Cornerstone of Safety level, while the MSPI does not 
integrate the results for the five individual mitigating 
systems into a single indicator. 
BRIIE results, although representing industry-wide 
results, are presented as average results per plant.  This is 
done because the NRC and stakeholders are more familiar 
with results per plant, rather than integrated industry-wide 
impacts.  If the PWR BRIIE result for a future year is 
calculated to be 1.0E-6/year (per PWR), then the PWR-
wide impact is actually (1.0E-6/year/PWR)(69 PWRs) = 
6.9E-5/year.  Similarly, if the BWR BRIIE is 1.0E-6/year 
(per BWR), then the BWR-wide impact is actually 
(1.0E-6/year/BWR)(34 BWRs) = 3.4E-5/year.  These 
industry-wide impacts should be kept in mind when 
establishing reporting thresholds for the BRIIE. 
Simulations of expected future performance of the 
PWR and BWR BRIIEs were performed to obtain 95% 
and 99% prediction limits.  Results are presented in Table 
III.
TABLE III.  BRIIE 95% and 99% prediction limits. 
Reactor
Type
95% Prediction 
Limit (ǻCDF)
99% Prediction 
Limit (ǻCDF)
PWR 2.2E-5/year/PWR 3.5E-5/year/PWR 
BWR 7.2E-6/year/BWR 1.1E-5/year/BWR 
Reporting thresholds for the two BRIIEs should be 
established considering the following information: 
Uncertainty in the BRIIEs and the 95% and 99% 
prediction limits from simulations 
Distributions of the Birnbaum importance measures 
and understanding of the groups of plants that have 
large values for specific initiating event classes 
Major contributors (i.e., dominant initiating event 
categories) to the BRIIEs 
Sensitivity of BRIIEs to initiating event classes, 
especially those with lower frequencies 
Other factors, such as the NRC Safety Goal Policy 
and Regulatory Guide 1.174 [9]. 
An expert panel would be established to propose threshold 
values that satisfy policy and operational needs and 
objectives.
Table IV shows the relationship among the ROP, the ITP, 
and the report to Congress.  It shows the potential actions 
that the ITP might take if a prediction limit is exceeded. 
IV. BRIIE HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND 
SENSITIVITY
Historical performance of the BRIIE (ǻCDF basis) is 
shown in Figure 2 for FY 1997 through FY 2003.  For all 
years except FY 2003, the PWR BRIIE dominates the 
BWR BRIIE in terms of variance from a baseline ǻCDF
of 0.0.  This illustrates the reason why separate BRIIEs 
are proposed for PWRs and BWRs.  For FY 1999, the 
PWR BRIIE peak of approximately 1.1E-5/year (per 
plant) is driven by the occurrence of two loss of DC bus 
initiating events.  This illustrates the sensitivity of the 
BRIIE to relatively infrequent but risk-important initiating 
events.
V. IMPLEMENTATION STEPS 
To implement the proposed ITP enhancements for the 
Initiating Events Cornerstone of Safety, several steps must 
be taken: 
1. Conduct a pilot exercise to set thresholds for both the 
Tier 1 individual initiating event categories and the 
Tier 2 BRIIE, based on the current example 
calculations.  From this we can learn what is the best 
way to present information to a panel and what 
additional information would be helpful when setting 
the thresholds. 
2. The Birnbaum importance measures used to quantify 
the PWR and BWR BRIIEs were obtained from 
SPAR Rev. 3i and 3 models in the summer of 2002 
for this demonstration exercise. Final Birnbaum 
importance measures should be obtained from the 
improved SPAR Rev. 3 models being completed by 
the NRC.  The initiating event frequencies and the 
basic event failure probabilities in the SPAR models 
should be updated before the final Birnbaum 
importance measures are estimated.  
3. Perform studies using the SPAR models to provide 
information about the robustness of the BRIIEs.  That 
is, determine if the BRIIE is insensitive to 
uncertainties in the parameter estimates.  Compare 
with industry PRA models where possible. 
4. Develop procedures, processes, and quality assurance 
guides for the Tier 1 and Tier 2 activities. 
TABLE IV.  Relationship among the ROP, ITP, and Report to Congress 
Reactor Oversight Process Industry Trends Program Report to Congress
Likely Responses to Individual 
Occurrences of Initiating Events
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Action To Be Taken If 
Industry Prediction Limit Is 
Exceeded for Indicated 
Initiating Event Class:
Action To Be Taken If 
BRIIE Threshold Is 
Exceeded:
 General Transient X   X
 Loss of Heat Sink X   X
 Loss of Feedwater X   X
 Loss of Offsite Power X X X X X X
 Loss of Vital AC Bus X X X X X X
 Loss of Vital DC Bus X X X X X X
 Stuck Open Safety Relief Valve X X X X X X
 Loss of Instrument Air X X X X X X
 Small/Very Small LOCA X X X X X X
 Steam Generator Tube Rupture X X X X X X
Investigate to determine 
reasons for exceeding the 
prediction limit.  Take 
actions as necessary 
following established 
processes (generic 
communications, generic 
safety inspections, etc.)
Document reasons for 
the exceedance and what 
has been done to 
address them.
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Figure 2. Historical Performance of the BRIIE 
5. The proposed Tier 1 and 2 activities should be 
formally incorporated into the ITP over a several-year 
period.  This allows for refinements as experience 
with these activities is accumulated. 
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